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JUVENILE JUSTICE GONE AWRY: EXPULSION
STATUTES UNJUSTLY DENY EDUCATIONAL
RIGHTS TO STUDENTS
Anthony H. Mansfieldt
Howard, a seventeen year old senior, had sold cocaine to under-
cover officers on three occasions. Two to three weeks following the last
incident, the officers arrested Howard while he was at school. Approxi-
mately one month after the incident, Howard was expelled from school.
None of the sales were alleged to have occurred on school property or at a
school sponsored event.'
Jane Doe was expelled from school based on her admission that she
was in possession of a lipstick case containing a one and one-quarter
inch blade. The school became aware of the blade when they noticed
bandages on Doe's wrist which were present because she had attempted
suicide. Another student had told the teacher that Doe should show the
lipstick knife. Upon doing so, Doe was suspended and a hearing was
held which determined that she should be expelled.2
I. INTRODUCTION
"Between 1985 and 1991, arrest rates for criminal homicide
increased 140% among thirteen- and fourteen-year-old males,
217% among fifteen-year-old males, 158% among sixteen-year-old
males, and 121% among seventeen-year-old males." 3  Unfortu-
nately, this violence has permeated the nation's public schools, se-
verely impacting a child's access to public education.
It is estimated that as many as fifty young people lose their
lives each year in school-related violence.4 This has resulted in ap-
t Candidate for J.D., 1996, City University of New York School of Law; M.S.W.,
1993, Boston University School of Social Work; B.A., 1991, Westfield State College.
All work done in the area of law and social work has been with the juvenile population
both in a legal and educational setting.
I Howard v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 621 A.2d 362 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992).
2 Doe v. Superintendent of Sch. of Worcester, 653 N.E.2d 1088 (Mass. 1995).
S Hattie Ruttenberg, The Limited Promise of Public Health Methodologies to Prevent
Youth Violence 103 YALE L.J. 1885, 1892 (1994) (citing Glenn L. Pierce &James A. Fox,
Recent Trends in Violent C7ime: A Closer Look [Nat'l Crime Analysis Program, Northeast-
ern Univ.] Oct. 1992, at 2-3).
4 CharlesJ. Russo, United States v. Lopez and the Demise of the Gun-Free School Zone
Act: Legislative Over-Reaching or Judicial Nit-Picking?, 99 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 11 (June
1995) (citing California Senator Dianne Feinstein, 140 CONG. REc., S6586 [daily ed.
June 8, 1994]).
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proximately 105 deaths attributed to school-related violence be-
tween 1990 and 1991.' Further, when focusing specifically on
weapons, gun shot wounds are the leading cause of death among
American teenage boys whether in school or out,6 while approxi-
mately 10% of all youngsters aged ten to nineteen say they have
fired a gun at someone or have themselves been the target of gun-
fire.7 Accordingly, within the past ten years, the death rate from
firearms for teenagers aged fifteen to nineteen has increased by61%.8
In 1993, 20% of American students knew someone who had
been attacked by an individual wielding a gun or a knife, while 7%
had been assaulted themselves. 9 A recent survey funded by Metro-
politan Life found that 11% of teachers and 23% of students re-
ported that they had been victims of violence in or near their
schools.10
Accompanying this increase in school violence has been a phe-
nomenal increase in the number of weapons seized in schools
across the country. Chicago schools have had a 171% increase in
seizures of weapons;"1 San Francisco, a 147% increase; 12 Indianap-
olis, a 322% increase;' 3 and, in Virginia, it was reported by a local
newspaper that 2313 students were found in possession of weapons
during the 1992-93 school year alone. 4 Students bring roughly
135,000 guns to the nation's 85,000 public schools each day. 5 Fur-
thermore, while one out of five high school students carries a
5 Id n.3 (citing Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Seeks Way of Avoiding Ruling on School Gun
Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1991, § 1, at 16).
6 Mary Kathleen Babcock, Constitutional Issues and the Safety of Schoolchildren: The
Tenth Circuit's Approach, 34 WASHBURN LJ. 33 (1994) (citing Timothy Dyer, War on
Handguns and Other Weapons, KAN. SCa. BOARD J., Apr.-May 1994, at 7).
7 Id. (citing Catherine Byers, Will the Lone Ranger Ever Ride Again?, KAN. SCH.
BOARD J., Apr.-May 1994, at 4).
8 Bernadine Dohm, As I See It: Children, Violence, and Mythology, CrnyscooLs,
Spring 1995, at 11 (citing Michael A. Jones and Barry Krisberg, Images and Reality:
Juvenile Crime, Youth Violence and Public Policy, NAT'L COUNC. ON CRIME & DELINQ.,June
1994 Fig. 6 at 18, source, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention).
9 Deborah Austern Colson, Safe Enough to Learn: Placing An Affirmative Duty of
Protection on Public Schools Under 42 US.C. § 1983, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 169
(1995) (citing ROBERT L. MAGINNiS, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, VIOLENCE IN THE
SCHOOL-HousE: A 10-YEAR UPDATE 3 (1994)).
10 R. Craig Wood & Mark D. Chestnutt, Violence In U.S. Schools: The Problems and
Some Responses, 97 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 619 (Apr. 1995) (citing THE METROPOLITAN
LIFE SURVEY OF THE AMERICAN TEACHER, Sept./Oct. 1993).
11 ABA Report; America's Children at Risk, at 28 (1995).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Wood & Chestnutt, supra note 10, at 619 (internal citation omitted).
15 Colson, supra note 9, at 170 (citing MAGINNIS, supra note 9, at 3).
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weapon to school on a daily basis, 6 it is estimated that 20% of
American high school students carry a weapon to school at least
once a month.
1 7
In response to this increase in weapons and violence within
the nation's schools, various states have enacted legislation to com-
bat and prevent school related violence. Unfortunately, the effect
of these expulsion statutes has been to unjustly deny educational
rights to many students. More importantly, expulsion statutes rep-
resent a severe departure from the goal and function of the juve-
nile justice system and do not address the actual cause of
delinquent behavior. In addition, most expulsion statutes do not
provide for alternative educational services or programs to actually
address the increase in violence or to prevent recidivism amongst
juvenile offenders.
In an attempt to answer these concerns, this Note will focus on
current statutes which provide for (1) the expulsion from school of
students found to possess a weapon and (2) the expulsion from
school of students who have been convicted for felonies and/or
adjudicated a delinquent.8 Part II of this Note gives a brief histori-
cal overview of the juvenile justice system and where it stands at
present. Part III gives an overview of the statutes in various states
which require the expulsion of students for the reasons previously
mentioned. Part IV presents a discussion of the problems which
expulsion statutes create. The problems addressed focus primarily
on how expulsion statutes depart from the intent behind the juve-
nile justice system and how such statutes fail to provide alternative
educational and other services to combat or prevent juvenile vio-
lence. In addition, statutes are also discussed which provide for the
disparate treatment of students. Part V addresses solutions which
have and are currently being implemented in various states to ad-
dress the issue of school-related violence as well as preventive steps
which this author believes must be considered.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
In 1833, Nicholas White, a nine-year old boy, removed a few
16 Babcock, supra note 6, at 33.
17 Colson, supra note 9, at 169 (citing Denise M. Topolnicki, Voices From the Mean
Street, MoNEY, June 1994, at 129).
18 There are also state statutes which provide for the expulsion of students for
other behavior such as the destruction of school property, threatening faculty and/or
students, disobedience, and possession of drugs and/or alcohol. However, this Note
will only focus on the two issues presented as they relate specifically to juvenile
adjudication.
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crayons from a broken window of a London shop. 9 For this of-
fense, Nicholas was sentenced to a public hanging.20 Unfortu-
nately, this was not a rare occurrence for, during the eighteenth
century, children who committed offenses were tried in the same
courts and received the same punishments as adults, including
death.21 This was also the situation in the United States because
our juvenile justice system developed out of England's chancery
courts, which were established to "protect and supervise" delin-
quent children.22
Under this system, the prevailing view was that children under
the age of seven were incapable of forming the intent necessary for
the imposition of criminal liability.2 Therefore, these children
were not held liable for felonious behavior. 24 However, this pre-
sumption of absolute incapacity was rebuttable for children aged
seven to fourteen by a demonstration that the child was able to
distinguish between right and wrong, that she had understood the
nature of the act, and that she knew that the act was wrong.
25 If
this was rebutted, the child was punished under the adult criminal
system. Conversely, children fourteen years or older were deemed
to have the same criminal capacity as adults and, therefore, were
subject to arrest, trial, and punishment like adult offenders.26
19 William Wilson, Note, Juvenile Offenders and the Electric Chair: Cruel and Unusual
Punishment or Firm Discipline for the Hopelessly Delinquent?, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 344 (1983)
(citing E. CALVERT, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 5 (2d ed. 1971)).
20 Id. (citing CALVERT, supra note 19, at 5-6).
21 Id.
22 Susan S. Greenebaum, Note, Conditional Access to Juvenile Court Proceedings: A
Prior Restraint or a Vable Solution?, 44 WASH. U.J. URn. & CONTEMP. L. 135, 140-41
(1993).
23 Linda Andr&Wells, Comment, Imposing the Death Penalty Upon Juvenile Offender's:
A Current Application of the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishment, 21 N.M. L. REv. 373, 375 (1991) (citing Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for
Children: The American Experience with Capital Punishment for Crimes Committed While
Under Age Eighteen, 36 OxUA. L. Ptv. 613, 614-15 (1983)); Helene B. Greenwald, Com-
ment, Capital Punishment for Minors: An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CIMINOLOGY 1471, 1473 (1983) (citing Martin A. Frey, The Criminal Responsibility of the
Juvenile Murderer, 1970 WASH. U. L.Q. 113, 113); Etta J. Mullen, Note, At What Age
Should They Die? The United States Supreme Court Decision With Respect to Juvenile Offenders
and the Death Penalty. Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri, 109 S. Ct. 2969
(1990), 16 T. MARsHALL L. REv. 161, 163 (1993) (citing Lisa Kline Arnett, Comment,
Death At An Early Age: International Law Arguments Against the Death Penalty forJuveniles,
57 U. CIN. L. Rxv. 245, 246 (1988)).
24 Greenwald, supra note 23, at 1473.
25 Andr&Wells, supra note 23, at 375; Greenwald, supra note 23, at 1473 (citing
Frey, supra note 23, at 113); Mullen, supra note 23, at 163 (citing Streib, supra note 23,
at 614).
26 Andr&Wells, supra note 23, at 375 (citing Streib, supra note 23, at 614-15); Mul-
len, supra note 23, at 163 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967)); Greenwald, supra
206 [Vol. 1:203
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Under this system of justice, children seven and above could be,
and were, tried, convicted, and sentenced under the adult criminal
system .27
Early reform movements of the nineteenth century sought to
change the system so children would not be subjected to the adult
process. The establishment in 1899 of a juvenile court in Cook
County, Illinois, marked the beginning stages of a separate judicial
system where the sole concern was the problems and misconduct
of youth. 8 By 1912, approximately half the states in this country
had juvenile justice legislation;' by 1925 all but two states, Maine
and Wyoming, had juvenile courts.30
It was at this time that the court first began to act as parens
patriae, thus becoming the parental authority with the obligation of
protecting children who were no longer able to care for them-
selves."1 The court attempted to steer away from punishment and,
therefore, was allowed broader discretion to intervene in the lives
of children. Through this approach, children were no longer dealt
with as criminals, but rather as wards of the state who were not fully
responsible for their conduct and, therefore, capable of rehabilita-
tion."2 The philosophy was that children were in need of protec-
tion from themselves and others and, if their families would not or
could not provide this protection, then the courts would. In ac-
cordance with this belief, children were designated delinquents
rather than criminals, hearings were considered "civil" rather than
"criminal",33 and findings and decisions were made without follow-
note 23, at 1473 (citing L. RADzINowicz, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750: Ti MOVEMENT FOR RrORM 12 (1948); Frey, supra note
23, at 113).
27 Greenwald, supra note 23, at 1473 (citing A. PIATr, THE CHID SAVERS: THE
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 198-99 (2d ed. 1977)).
28 Sheila L. Sanders, The Imposition of Capital Punishment on Juvenile Offenders: Drau-
ing the Line, 19 S.U. L. REv. 141, 143 (1992); Francis Barry McCarthy, The Serious
Offender and Juvenile Court Reform: The Case for Prosecutorial Waiver ofJuvenile Court Juris-
diction; 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 629, 643 (1994) (citing Sanford J. Fox, Responsibility in
Juvenile Court 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 659 (1970)); SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RiGcHTs OF
JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, § 1-2 (2d ed. 1994).
29 Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Juveniles, Juv. IN L. & Soc'Y, at 4 (1987).
30 Id.; Greenwald, supra note 23, at 1474.
31 DAVIS, supra note 28, § 1-2.
32 DAVIS, supra note 28, § 1-2 (citing Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv.
L. REv. 104, 109 (1909)).
33 DAVIS, supra note 28, § 1-3 (citing Ex parte Sharp, 96 P. 563 (1908)); Greene-
baum, supra note 22, at 141-42 (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 544 n.5
(1971)).
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ing normal criminal procedure rules.3 4
Because the proceedings followed a different approach, steps
were taken to distinguish a juvenile proceeding from a criminal
proceeding. The juvenile court building was located apart from
the criminal court building so as to avoid any stigma from the adult
proceeding.3 5 A "euphemistic" 6 vocabulary was introduced, hear-
ings were confidential, and access to court records limited. 7 Fur-
ther, juvenile court proceedings focused more on the child's
background and welfare than on the facts of the alleged crime.3 8
Judges began to see their jobs as including "early identification,
diagnosis, prescription of treatment, implementation of therapy,
and cure or rehabilitation under aftercare supervision."3 9 They de-
pended solely on the principles of psychology and social work
rather than on formal rules in their decision process. The court's
responsibility became one of collecting information about the
child's life history, character, social environment, and individual
circumstances.4 0 At hearings and dispositions, the court directed
its attention first and foremost to the child's character and lifestyle
because it believed that the child's past would reveal the proper
treatment.
41
The underlying goal of the juvenile system was to intervene
before serious misconduct occurred. Rather than reflecting over
past criminal acts, the system attempted to predict the behavior of
the child in the hopes of preventing the behavior from actually
occurring. The system was designed to offer a child approximately
the same care, custody, and discipline that a loving parent would. 2
This was done by avoiding harsh criminal penalties for child of-
fenders and providing conventionally approved moral, ethical,
political, and social values for deprived, unfortunate children. 3
34 Greenebaum, supra note 22, at 142 (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528, 544 n.5 (1971)).
35 Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle Offense: Punishment, Treatment,
and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 825 (1988) (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. Or JusTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENME DELIN-
QUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 92-93 (1967); D. ROmTMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE:




39 Frederic L. Faust & PaulJ. Brantingham,JuvenileJustice Philosophy: Readings,
Cases and Comments 147 (1974).
40 Feld, supra note 35, at 825.
41 Feld, supra note 35, at 825.
42 Streib, supra note 29, at 4.
43 Streib, supra note 29, at 5.
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The emphasis was on rescue, meaning that the proceeding was to
be non adversarial, presided over by a judge-a father figure 44-
who represented the interests of the child and the interests of the
state. The ultimate hope was that reformed children would be free
of any stigma of being a delinquent child.45
However, the historical process of the juvenile justice system
began to change with the Supreme Court's decision in Kent v.
United States.4 In Kent, the Court dealt with the due process re-
quirements of a sixteen-year old whose case was transferred from
juvenile to adult criminal court, was convicted of six felonies, and
was sentenced to a total of thirty to ninety years in prison. This was
the first time the U.S. Supreme Court demonstrated a willingness
to review the juvenile justice process and establish standards for
due process and individual rights within the system. In conjunc-
tion with this holding, the judiciary, Congress, and society, began
to question the parens patriae approach and, as a result, juvenile
proceedings have become more similar to those of adult criminal
proceedings.
Recent legislation has also taken a more punitive philosophy
as opposed to the historical rehabilitative philosophy of the juve-
nile system.47 This departure has largely been in response to soci-
ety's belief that there has been a substantial increase in violent
youth crime.48 Juvenile courts are now required to adhere to spe-
cific constitutional guidelines and may no longer ignore proce-
dural "niceties"" so as to provide the treatment a judge may
believe is in the best interest of the child. Because the focus is now
more on punishment than on treatment, serious juvenile offenders
are being transferred from juvenile court to criminal court. This is
evident in a recent Senate bill which provided that a juvenile be-
tween the ages of thirteen and fourteen accused of a serious fed-
eral violent crime be tried as an adult, which, in turn, could expose
44 DAVIS, supra note 28, § 1-2.
45 Greenebaum, supra note 22, at 142 (citing Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the
Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 281, 282 (1967)).
46 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
47 This is seen in criminal proceedings in which children above the age of thirteen
and/or fifteen are tried as adults for specific designated felonies. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 30.30.
48 According to a 1982 public opinion poll commissioned by the National Council
on Crime and Delinquency, the Field Institute, and the Hubert Humphrey Institute
of Public Affairs, which was conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation, 87% of
those polled believed that juvenile crime was increasing at an alarming rate.
49 Streib, supra note 29, at 6.
1996] 209
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them to the death penalty. 50 Unfortunately, the statistics present
throughout the country5 are moving this transition along much
faster and are affecting more areas of a minor's life than anyone
may have expected or even been aware.
III. OVERVIEW OF WEAPON ExPuLsiON LAWS
In response to the increase in school related violence, Con-
gress enacted the Federal Gun-Free Schools Act as part of the
Crime Control Act of 1990.52 This Act would make it a federal of-
fense for any individual to knowingly possess a firearm in a place
that the individual believed or had reasonable cause to believe was
a school zone.53 In addition, federal education funds were condi-
tioned on a state's adherence to the Act. Under the Act, a school
zone was defined as "in, or on the grounds of, a public, parochial
or private school" or "within a distance of 1000 feet from the
grounds of a public, parochial or private school." 54 However, this
Act was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United
States in United States v. Lopez.55
Although Lopez nullified the original Gun-Free School Zones
Act, forty-three states have statutes imposing sanctions on individu-
als who bring weapons onto school property.56 The Court's hold-
ing in Lopez did not invalidate these state statutes, nor did it
prevent school districts from drafting other restrictions pertaining
to weapon possession within a school zone. This is primarily be-
cause Lopez did not eliminate "the obligation of states receiving fed-
eral education funds to mandate specific penalties for students
who carry firearms onto school property under the 'Gun-Free
Schools Act of 1994' which Congress enacted as part of amend-
50 See Juvenile Crime and Delinquency: Do We Need Prevention?, 1994: Heaing Before the
Subcommittee on Human Resources Committee on Education and Labor United States of Repre-
sentatives, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Committee Hearing] (statement
of Karabelle Pizzigati, Director of Public Policy, Child Welfare League of America).
51 See supra text accompanying notes 3-17.
52 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed.).
53 Id. at (q)(1)(1).
54 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (25).
55 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
56 High Court Derails Federal Anti-Gun Law, SCH. L. NEws, 23, May 5, 1995, at 1, 3.
The article notes that only seven states lack statutes similar to the Gun-Free School
Zones Act. These states include Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Montana, New
Hampshire and Wyoming. However, New Hampshire has passed Chapter 193-D
which establishes standards and procedures which shall require expulsion of a pupil
for knowingly possessing a firearm in a safe school zone without written authorization
from the superintendent or designee.
[Vol. 1:203210
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ments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)."57
Therefore, states that wish to receive educational funding are man-
dated to implement policies which require the referral of any stu-
dent who brings a weapon to school to the criminal justice system
or juvenile delinquency system.58 This provision passes constitu-
tional muster because, unlike Lopez, it is premised on Congress's
power under the Spending Clause of the United States
Constitution.59
In addition to these statutes, legislation has designated other
various circumstances in which a student may be suspended and/
or expelled from school at a principal's, school board's, or superin-
tendent's discretion. And, in accordance with the Act, the most
common circumstance among state statutes is where students are
found to be in possession of weapons. Another circumstance gain-
ing significant respect is where students are charged and/or con-
victed of a felony and/or adjudicated a delinquent, even for
behavior off school grounds.
A. Weapons
States which have enacted legislation allowing for the expul-
sion of students who bring weapons to school are numerous and
distinguishable. 0 One distinction between these statutes is the
57 Daniel B. Kohrman & Kathryn M. Woodruff, Commentary, The 1994-95 Term of
The United States Supreme Court and its Impact on Public Schools, 102 Educ. L. Rep. (West)
421 (Oct. 1995).
58 Id.
59 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
60 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-841 (B) (1995) (a pupil may only be expelled
for violent behavior which includes the use or display of a dangerous instrument or
deadly weapon or possession of a gun); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900(b) (West 1993-94)
(a pupil shall be suspended from school or recommended for expulsion if the super-
intendent or the principal of the school determines that the pupil has possessed, sold,
or otherwise furnished any firearm, knife, explosive, or other dangerous object un-
less, in the case of possession of any object of this type, the pupil had obtained written
permission to possess the item from a certified school employee, which is concurred
in by the principal or the designee of the principal); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-233d(a)
(1995) (expulsion proceedings shall be required whenever there is reason to believe
that any pupil was in possession of a firearm or deadly weapon and such pupil shall be
expelled for one calendar year); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.1 (a) (1995) (each local
board of education shall establish a policy requiring the expulsion from school for a
period of not less than one calendar year any student who is determined to have
brought a weapon to school); IDAHO CODE § 33-205 (1995) (the board shall expel
from school for a period of not less than one year a student who has been found to
have carried a weapon or firearm on school property); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 158.150(1)(a) (Baldwin 1995) (the carrying or use of weapons on school property,
as well as off school property at school-sponsored activities, constitutes cause for sus-
pension or expulsion from school); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:416(B) (West 1994) (a
1996] 211
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length of an expulsion for the possession of a weapon. While most
of the statutes cited provide for an expulsion period of one year,6'
some provide for a modification on a case-by-case basis,6 2 some
provide for permanent expulsion,63 while others differ even more
significantly."
While the above mentioned statutes clearly provide for the ex-
pulsion of a student found to be in possession of a weapon, there
are other statutes which allow similar results without such specific
principal may recommend, after immediate suspension, expulsion of a student carry-
ing or possessing a firearm); MD. CODE. ANN., EDuc. § 7-304(2) (1995) (if the county
superintendent or the superintendent's designated represenfft ve finds that a student
has brought a firearm onto school property, the student shall be expelled); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71 § 37H (West 1993) (grants discretionary power to the princi-
pal to expel a student for the possession of a dangerous weapon on school property or
at a school-sponsored event); MicH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 380.1311(2) (West 1995) (if a
pupil possesses a weapon, the school board, or the designee of the school board, shall
expel the pupil from the school district permanently, subject to possible reinstate-
ment under subsection (5)); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 193-D:2(I)(2) (1994) (the state
board of education shall adopt rules regarding standards and procedures which shall
require expulsion of a pupil for knowingly possessing a firearm in a safe school zone
without written authorization from the superintendent or designee); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-5-4.7(A) (Michie 1978) (each school district shall adopt a policy providing for
the expulsion from school, for a period of not less than one year, of any student who
is determined to have knowingly brought a weapon to a school); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-391(dl) (1995) (a local board of education shall suspend for 365 days any
student who brings a weapon onto school property); OR. REv. STAT. § 339.250(6)
(1995) (a school district shall have a policy that requires the expulsion from school
for a period of not less than one year any student who is determined to have brought
a weapon to a school); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 13-32-4 (1995) (the board may
expel from school any student for the use or possession of a firearm on or in any
elementary or secondary school premises, vehicle, or building or any premises, vehi-
cle, or building used or leased for elementary or secondary school functions or activi-
ties); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-904(2) (a) (i) (1995) (a student shall be suspended or
expelled from a public school for the possession, control, or actual or threatened use
of a real, look alike, or pretend weapon, explosive, or noxious or flammable
material).
61 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-233d(a) (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.1(a) (1995);
IDAHO CODE § 33-205 (1995); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71 § 37H (West 1993); MD.
CODE. ANN., EDUC. § 7-304(2) (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4.7(A) (Michie 1978);
S.D. CODIIED LAws ANN. § 13-32-4 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-904(2) (a)
(1953).
62 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-233d(a) (1995); GA CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.1(a) (1995);
IDAHO CODE § 33-205 (1995); MD. CODE. ANN., EDUC. § 7-304(3) (1995) (however,
this will only apply if alternative education has been approved); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-
5-4.7(A) (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391(dl) (1995); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 53A-11-904(2) (b) (1953).
63 MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 380.1311(2) (West 1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-
1318 (1949); 89-66 S.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 168 (1989).
64 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.66(B) (Baldwin 1995) (provides for the expulsion
of a student for up to 80 days).
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language.65 The language in these statutes is very broad, making it
possible for a student in possession of a weapon to be expelled
even though the statute does not specify such an action.
These statutes are also important because, in all states cited
and under the requirements for receiving federal funding, a stu-
dent who is found to be in possession of a weapon must be re-
ported to the criminal justice system or juvenile delinquency
system 66 and possession of a weapon constitutes a crime in which a
minor can be charged. Thus, while students are being expelled
from school for such offenses, they are also being indicted. Ac-
cordingly, in those situations where a minor is only subject to sus-
pension for a possession violation, she is often later expelled if
convicted and, in some states, is even charged as an adult.
Two examples of this are Arkansas and Illinois. Arkansas has a
statute which makes the possession of a handgun by any person on
school property or any school bus a felony.67 In addition, any stu-
dent who violates the statute is not permitted a suspended or lim-
ited sentence. An Illinois statute provides that a minor, aged
fourteen to sixteen, who is indicted for the unlawful possession or
use of a weapon in or on school grounds, will have her case auto-
matically transferred to criminal court.68
B. Conviction For Felonies/Adjudication As A Delinquent
Of greater concern to the aforementioned weapon expulsion
statutes are those expulsion statutes which authorize school dis-
tricts, either through the principal, superintendent, or local school
board, to expel students who have been charged with and/or con-
victed for felonies or adjudicated a delinquent.69 These statutes
65 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.26(1) (c) (West 1994) (the principal may recommend to
the superintendent the expulsion of any student who has committed a serious breach
of conduct, including willful disobedience, violence against persons, or any other act
which substantially disrupts the orderly conduct of the school); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 18A:37-2 (C) (West 1994) (any pupil who is guilty of conduct of such character as to
constitute a continuing danger to the physical well-being of other pupils shall be lia-
ble to punishment and expulsion from school); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1318
(1949) (every principal or teacher may permanently expel any pupil on account of
disobedience or misconduct); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-210 (Law. Co-op 1973) (any
district board of trustees may authorize or order the expulsion of any pupil for a
commission of any crime, gross immorality, gross misbehavior, persistent disobedi-
ence, or when the presence of the pupil is detrimental to the best interest of the
school).
66 Kohrman & Woodruff, supra note 57.
67 AR. CODE ANN., § 5-73-119 (Michie 1992).
68 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 37, para. 702-6 (1992).
69 See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 14.30.045(5) (1994) ("A school-aged child may be sus-
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permit school districts to go beyond disciplining students for con-
duct or behavior which occurs on school property or while on
school-sponsored activities. The statutes, however, generally differ
as to whether there is an immediate expulsion following the stu-
dent being charged with a felony or whether a student is automati-
cally expelled upon conviction and/or adjudication as a delinquent.
pended from or denied admission to the public school that the child is otherwise
entitled to attend" if the child is convicted of a felony "that the governing body of the
district determines will cause the attendance of the child to be inimicable [sic] to the
welfare or education of other pupils."); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-105 (5) (a)
(1994) ("Whenever a petition filed in juvenile court alleges that a child between the
ages of 14 and 18 has committed an offense that would constitute a crime of violence
if committed by an adult or whenever charges are filed in district court allege that a
child has committed such an offense, the board of education of the school district
shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the student should be educated in the
school. Thus the board shall determine if sufficient grounds exist to expel the stu-
dent at that time and shall proceed with the expulsion. Alternatively, the board may
determine that it will wait until the conclusion of the juvenile proceedings to consider
the expulsion matter."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.26(2) (West 1994) ("Suspension pro-
ceedings may be initiated against any pupil who is formally charged with a felony, or
with a delinquent act which would be a felony if committed by an adult if that inci-
dent is shown to have an adverse impact on the educational program, discipline, or
welfare in the school in which the student is enrolled. Any pupil who is suspended as
a result of such proceedings may be suspended from all classes of instruction on pub-
lic school grounds during regular classroom hours for a period of time, which may
exceed 10 days, as determined by the superintendent. If the pupil is found guilty of a
felony, the superintendent shall have the authority to determine if a recommendation
for expulsion shall be made to the school board."); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:416(D)
(West 1994) ("For the conviction of any student of a felony or the incarceration of
any student in a juvenile institution for an act which had it been committed by an
adult, would have constituted a felony, shall be cause for expulsion of the student for
a period of time as determined by the board."); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, § 37H
1/2 (West 1994) ("The principal may suspend, for a period of time determined ap-
propriate by the school's principal, any student against whom a criminal or felony
delinquency complaint has been issued. In addition, the principal may expel any
student who has been convicted or admitted guilt in court with respect to a felony
delinquency."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391(d) (1995) ("A local board of education
may, upon recommendation of the principal and superintendent, expel any student
14 years of age or older who has been convicted of a felony and whose continued
presence in school constitutes a clear threat to the safety and health of other students
or employees."); OHio Rxv. CODE ANN. § 3313.662 (Baldwin 1995) ("The superinten-
dent of public instruction may issue an adjudication order that permanently excludes
a pupil from attending any of the public schools of this state if the pupil is convicted
of, or adjudicated a delinquent child for, committing, when he was 16 years of age or
older, an act that would be a criminal offense if committed by an adult."); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 59-63-210 (Law. Co-op 1973) ("Any district board of trustees may authorize or
order the expulsion, suspension, or transfer of any pupil for a commission of any
crime when the presence of the pupil is detrimental to the best interest of the
school."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1 1-904(2) (a) (ii) (1995) ("A student shall be sus-
pended or expelled from a public school for the commission of an act involving the
use of force or the threatened use of force which if committed by an adult would be a
felony or class A misdemeanor.").
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Some school districts are authorized to suspend a student im-
mediately after she has been charged with a felony or criminal juve-
nile complaint.7" Such statutes allow for the principal,
superintendent or school board to suspend a student who has a
criminal or felony delinquency complaint filed against her for a
period of time deemed appropriate. Under such statutes, if the
charges are later dismissed or the student has been convicted and/
or adjudicated a delinquent, then the suspension is terminated.
Unfortunately, in the latter situation, expulsion is substituted for
the suspension. It is only Florida, however, that mandates alterna-
tive education for any student it decides should be suspended from
school while court proceedings are occurring.7 ' It is thus the
school board's responsibility to provide suspended students with
an appropriate alternative educational program or a home-based
educational program. Conversely, most state statutes do not man-
date that educational services be provided at any time during ex-
pulsion. This issue is discussed in greater length in part IV.
There are expulsion statutes which go beyond simply sus-
pending students charged with a felony or juvenile charge. Some
statutes permit school districts to expel a student merely for being
charged with a felony or delinquent act.' Such statutes provide
that if the principal or school board determines that the student's
presence within the school system presents a danger to the safety
and health of other students and/or employees, then the student
may be expelled immediately-even prior to conviction or
adjudication.7"
The final step authorized by school districts is the expulsion
from school of those students who have been convicted for a felony
and/or adjudicated a delinquent.74
IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
A. Lack of Alternative Education or Readmission Programs
The most notable departure of expulsion statutes from the his-
torical concept of juvenile justice is that education is no longer
70 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-105(5) (a) (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 232.26(2) (West 1994); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37H 1/2 (West 1994).
71 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.26(2) (West 1994) (such suspension shall not affect the
delivery of educational services to the pupil, and the pupil shall be immediately en-
rolled in a daytime alternative education program, or an evening alternative educa-
tion program, where appropriate.)
72 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-105(5)(a) (1994).
73 Id.
74 See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 37, para. 702-6 (1992).
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viewed as essential. This is demonstrated in the fact that under
some expulsion statutes, school districts are not mandated to pro-
vide an alternative education to suspended and/or expelled stu-
dents. Nor are school districts mandated to provide for the
readmission of an expelled student to another school or school dis-
trict. Therefore, this author believes that the first place to start in
challenging the constitutionality of expulsion statutes is to deter-
mine: (1) whether there is a federal or state constitutional right to
an education; (2) whether alternative education is offered to those
students who are expelled; (3) whether an expelled student is per-
mitted to transfer to another school district; and (4) what detri-
ment is caused by the lack of alternative educational services.
The issue of whether there is a federal right to an education
was addressed by the Supreme Court in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez75 where the Court held that public education was not a
right granted to individuals by the United States Constitution.7 6
However, while the Court was not willing to hold education to be a
fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny analysis, the court ex-
plicitly accepted the premise from Brown v. Board of Educ7 that
"education is perhaps the most important function of state and lo-
cal governments. "78
Further, in Plyler v. Doe,79 while the Court again declined to
hold that education was a fundamental right, the Court neverthe-
less appeared to treat education under a higher standard than a
mere rational relationship test.8" Therefore, while the Court held
that education is not a right guaranteed by the United States Con-
stitution, it does hold such a privilege to a higher standard.
Since there is no fundamental right to an education in the
federal constitution, we must look to individual state constitutions.
Because state constitutions can expand the rights of state citizens
beyond those they hold as a matter of federal law,8 students in
some states have a guaranteed right to an education while students
in other states receive it only as a privilege.
Massachusetts, which guarantees a free education in its consti-
75 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
76 Id. at 26.
77 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
78 Id. at 493.
79 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
80 Id. at 225. In Plyler v. Doe, under an equal protection argument, the Court held
that there was no rational reason that the state could give for denying children of
illegal aliens an education.
81 See, e.g., William Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HArv. L. REv. 489 (1977).
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tution, 2 is among the states which establish state constitutional
protection in the area of public education."3 In McDuffy v. Secretary
of the Executive Office of Educ.,s the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts held that, after examining the views of those who
framed and adopted the state's constitution, there was compelling
support that the legislature has a duty to provide an education "for
all its children, rich and poor, in every city and town of the Com-
monwealth at the public school level." 5
However, while some states do provide education as a funda-
mental right, 6 they do not provide alternative forms of education
for students who have been expelled. Therefore, while expulsion
statutes have expanded the powers of principals, superintendents
and school boards, these same statutes have failed to protect the
cast-out students by not requiring re-admittance to school or the
mandate to provide educational services to the student who has
been expelled.
For example, in Massachusetts, which provides that education
is a fundamental right, school districts are refusing to provide alter-
native educational services to expelled students by relying on Board
of Educ. v. Sch. Comm. of Quincy."7 There, the state's high court held
that compulsory attendance statutes create no right of alternative
education for expelled students. The court stated that compulsory
attendance statutes address only who shall attend school and
where; they do not require a school committee to provide an edu-
cational alternative to an individual child who is excluded from the
public school for disciplinary reasons.8 8 The court stated that if
this were the case, the board would exceed its statutory authority
and intrude on the school committees' right to discipline stu-
82 MAss. CoNsTr. part II, ch. 5, § 2.
83 According to VictoriaJ. Dodd, An (Adequate) EducationforAU: McDuffy v. Secre-
tary of Education, TiE ADVOCATE, Fall 1993, at 20, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
Kentucky, Montana, NewJersey, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming are
among the states that guarantee an education in their constitution. In addition, ac-
cording to case law, other states also provide education as a constitutional right in
their state constitutions, including Alaska (Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated School
System, 536 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1975)); Arizona (Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist.
Number 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994)); Georgia (Wells v. Banks, 266 S.E.2d
270 (Ga. 1980)); Minnesota (Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993)); New York
(Scott v. Bd. of Educ., 305 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969)); and North
Dakota (Bismark Public Sch. Dist. #1 v. North Dakota Legislative Assembly, 511
N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994)).
84 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
85 Id. at 548.
86 See supra note 83.
87 612 N.E.2d 666 (Mass. 1993).
88 Id. at 670.
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dents.8 9 (In Massachusetts, the school committee consists of mem-
bers who are elected officials whereas a school board is composed
simply of parents and teachers from a particular school.)
This issue of a state's failure to provide alternative education is
vitally important because some students who are expelled are not
permitted to transfer to another school district or to a school in a
different state. In essence, a child is refused any future opportu-
nity to learn.
An example of this is Arkansas,90 where a school district may
refuse to admit any pupil who has been expelled from another ed-
ucational institution or who is in the process of being expelled
from another educational institution. In addition, Michigan9 1 pro-
vides that, except if a school district operates or participates in a
program appropriate for individuals expelled and, in its discretion,
admits the individual to such program, an expelled student is ex-
pelled from all public schools in the state and a school district shall
not allow the individual to re-enroll in the school district unless the
individual has been reinstated. 92 Unfortunately, many states follow
this process.9'
By not allowing a student alternative forms of education or the
opportunity to re-enter school, states are depriving students of the
fresh start envisioned by the juvenile justice system. By not provid-
ing students with a fresh start, we are creating, rather than prevent-
ing, the problem. Because they are not provided the knowledge
necessary to lead a productive future, most students who do not
receive an education are caught in a never ending cycle which, for
some, leads to future crime.
While schooling has as its most important goal the teaching of
academics to students, it also serves the essential task of preparing
young people for their future roles as workers and consumers. 94 A
major function of schools is to socialize young people to assume a
position within the national economy.95 Therefore, the process is
not a "simplistic education [of] particular mental and physical
89 Id.
90 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-841(C) (Michie 1994).
91 See Micam. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1311(3) (West 1995).
92 Id.
93 See ALAsKA STAT. § 14.30.045 (1994); AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-841(C) & (D)
(1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-233d(h) (1995); IDAHO CODE § 33-205 (1995); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 158.155(1) (Baldwin 1995): LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:416(B) (West
1994); MIss. CODE ANN. § 37-13-92(2) (1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.115(4) (a) & (b)
(1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-904(3) (1953).
94 MA. BORTNER, DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE: AN AGE OF CRISIS 19 (1988).
95 Id.
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tasks or the attainment of particular skill levels[, but] involves an
[indoctrination] of the attitudes and values [which are] necessary
for individuals to fit into the adult working world."9 6 This hidden
curriculum instills in students the values and attitudes which are
essential to generate conformity with the dominant power and
work force within the country.
97
In addition, the importance of education can be seen in the
fact that historically, Americans have consistently placed great
value on public education because it is
perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great ex-
penditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of
the importance of education to our democratic society. It is re-
quired in the performance of our most basic responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal [sic] instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust nor-
mally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportu-
nity of an education.98
Moreover, it has been held that children benefit more from being
educated in a collective classroom environment than in individual se-
clusion at home.99 The importance of education is also evident in the
fact that all states provide for compulsory school attendance either
legislatively or through constitutional provisions.'
96 Id.
97 Id. (citing LARRY VAN SicKLE, THE AMEac.AN DREAM AND THE IMPACT OF CLASS:
TEACHING POOR KIDS TO LABOR (1985)).
98 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (emphasis added).
99 It has been held by numerous courts that it is permissible for a state to prohibit
home tutoring in place of its compulsory school attendance requirement because of
the effect that classrooms have on youth. See, e.g., Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d
96 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denieA 465 U.S. 1006 (1984). In so holding, courts have rea-
soned that states have a legitimate interest in requiring children to be educated in a
classroom because children can benefit from the social interaction with other chil-
dren who have different attitudes and abilities. See, e.g., Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689
F. Supp. 106 (N.D.N.Y. 1988), appeal dismissed, 866 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1989).
100 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.010(a) (1962-1995) (every child between 7 and 16
years of age shall attend school); Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-802(a) (every child be-
tween the ages of 6 and 16 shall be provided instruction in at least the subjects of
reading, grammar, mathematics, social studies and science); CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 48200 (West 1993-94) (each person between the ages of 6 and 18 years is subject to
compulsory full-time education); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-33-104 (West 1963)
(every child between the ages of 7 and 16 shall attend public school); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 31-402(a) (1983) (every child between the ages of 5 and 18 shall attend public
school); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 232.01 (West 1994) (all children between the ages of 6
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Youth who receive no form of formal education, or receive an
inadequate education, will be unable to function in the future or to
compete with those who have received either an elementary, secon-
dary, or post graduate education. This is because, as Thomas Jeffer-
son suggested, "some degree of education is necessary to prepare
citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political
system." 10' Education provides a basic tool by which youth lead eco-
nomically productive lives to the benefit of society. We cannot ignore
the significant social costs borne by our nation when select groups of
children are denied the means to learn the values and skills upon
which our society depends simply because they have engaged in be-
havior which is not considered to be moral or in the best interests or
safety of those who attend elementary and secondary schools.
When looking at the premise behind the juvenile justice system,
education is the first step to rehabilitation. To disrupt a child's educa-
tion for a substantial period of time either while a trial is pending or
after conviction is extremely damaging, both academically and
psychologically.
Firstly, to deprive a child of an education is to tell her that society
has given up on her and that she is not as worthy as other children. If
society is not willing to provide an individual youth with an education,
and 16 are required to attend school regularly during the entire school term); HAw.
REV. STAT. § 298-9(a) (1988-94) (all children between the ages of 6 and 18 shall at-
tend either a private or public school); IDAHO CODE § 33-202 (1948-95) (every child
between the ages of 7 and 16 shall be instructed in subjects commonly and usually
taught in the public schools); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 105, para. 26-1 (Smith-Hurd) (every
child between the ages of 7 and 16 shall attend some public school); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 299.1A (West 1994) (a child between the ages of 6 and 16 shall attend school); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 72-1111 (a) (1994) (every child between the ages of 7 and 16 shall attend
school); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 159.10 (Baldwin 1994) (every child between the ages of
6 and 16 shall attend a regular school); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 221 (West) (every child
from the age of 7 to 17 shall attend school); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3271 (children
who are at least 7 and under 17 shall attend a public day elementary or secondary
school or an approved private school); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-301 (1991 & 1992
Supp.) (requires compulsory school attendance for children between the ages of 5
and 16); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3271 (every child from the age of 6 to 16 shall attend
public school); Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91 (f) (compulsory-school-age child means a
child who has or will attain the age of 6 on or before September 1 and who has not
attained the age of 17 on or before September 1); OP. REV. STAT. § 339.010 (1993)
(all children between the ages of 7 and 18 who have not completed the 12th grade
are required to attend regularly a public full-time school); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-
3001 (1992) (requires compulsory school attendance for children between the ages of
6 and 17); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-101 (every minor between 6 and 18 years of age
shall attend a public or regularly established private school). The only major differ-
ence among all compulsory attendance statutes are (1) the difference in the mini-
mum and maximum age requirements, and (2) whether home tutoring is included.
101 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
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then what other services will it be willing to provide when the child is
unable to provide further for themselves?
Secondly, if we fail to educate our children, then we are not pro-
viding them with the necessary tools to survive. By not providing an
education, society is setting up these youth for failure and future crim-
inal involvement. When these children become adults, they will be
less apt to provide financially for themselves and/or their families be-
cause, with a limited or no source of income, they are more likely to
turn to crime to survive.
It is essential to consider this issue because most expulsion stat-
utes cited provide for the exclusion of students for a time period of
not less than a year,"' while some go as far as expelling a child perma-
nently. 03 In addition, some statutes do not provide a time frame for
the exclusion, thus leaving the determination to the principal, super-
intendent or school board. Therefore, many of these youth are losing
a substantial, if not a complete, education. If nothing is provided for
them, we, as a society, have failed.
In contradiction to expulsion statutes which provide for no forms
of alternative education, either temporarily or permanently, these
states do have statutes which mandate compulsory school attendance.
This raises two issues: (1) states still act as parens patriae,' °4 and (2)
states are portraying a hypocritical belief that education is important
for some, but not for all of its children.
A state is acting as parens patriae when, as is evident in most of the
statutes cited,10 5 it provides some form of punishment for parents who
do not ensure that their children are attending school. Therefore,
the state is essentially stepping in and telling the parents that if they
do not provide this essential tool to their children, they will be pun-
ished. A state's strong belief that education is important and essential
for the well-being of minors is evident in the fact that a state fre-
quently has the power to require school attendance even over paren-
tal objection. 106 This leads to the issue that states are governing
under a double standard.
102 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-233D(a) (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-151.1(a)
(1995); IDAHO CODE § 33-205 (1995); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, § 37H (West
1993); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-304(2) (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4.7(A)
(Michie 1978); OiL REV. STAT. § 339.250(6) (1995); S.D. CODFED LAWS ANN. § 13-32-
4 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-904(2)(a) (1953).
103 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 380.1311(2) (West 1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
24, § 13-1318 (1949); 89-66 Op. Att'y Gen. 168 (S.C. 1989).
104 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
105 See supra note 100.
106 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 166.
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By creating compulsory attendance statutes, all states express
their belief that education is essential. However, not all states are will-
ing to provide this essential privilege to all children. This is demon-
strated by a state's lack of alternative educational programs for those
students who have been excluded from school. This again suggests
that states are governing with a double standard. This can only rein-
force a student's belief that she is unworthy.
B. Behavior Off of School Grounds
As mentioned previously, states are failing to consider that stu-
dents expelled because of a conviction more likely than not en-
gaged in this behavior off of school grounds; the requisite conduct
does not need to be an act which occurred on school property or
against school personnel. Children are being excluded from
school for behavior which may have little or no relationship to
their conduct or performance in school.
An example of this is Connecticut where a local or regional
board of education may expel any pupil whose conduct endangers
persons or property or whose conduct on or off school grounds is
seriously disruptive of the educational process, or violates a publi-
cized policy of such board.'07 The statute does not explain what is
meant by this standard nor does it outline a test which should be
applied to the conduct. The statute neither addresses nor shows a
correlation between this "off-school-grounds" behavior and obedi-
ence of school rules. There is, in fact, no relationship. How are we
to punish kids when there is no demonstrated relationship?
C. Confidentiality of Records
An issue which must be addressed when considering expulsion
based on conviction and/or adjudication statutes is the confidenti-
ality of juvenile records. In response to this issue, legislation has
historically protected ajuvenile's identity from the general public
so as to aid in the rehabilitation of the juvenile and prevent the
stigmatization of the youth. 08 However, expulsion based on con-
viction statutes now make it necessary for the principal, school su-
perintendent, or board of education to be notified or given access
to ajuvenile's criminal record in order to determine if that student
has been charged with or convicted for a felony and/or adjudi-
cated a delinquent. Therefore, the question of imminent concern
107 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-233d(a) (1995).
108 Feld, supra note 35, at 825.
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is how does this process work to favor a juvenile under the in-
tended purpose of the juvenile justice system?
In answer to this question, many respond that "[i]f schools
know the identity of a violent juvenile, they can respond to misbe-
haviors [sic] by imposing stricter sanctions, assigning particular
teachers, or having the student's locker near a teacher's doorway
entrance so that the teacher can monitor his conduct during the
changing of class periods. In short, this... would allow schools to
take measures to prevent violence"" 9 which some view as the goal
behind the juvenile justice system. However, the reason for such
confidentiality is the rehabilitation of delinquent children as op-
posed to punishment and retribution. Therefore, to accomplish
these objectives, certain basic changes in the traditional method of
dealing with criminal offenders has been made in the case of
juveniles. Partly to avoid infringement of the constitutional rights
of juveniles and partly to avoid attaching to them the stigma of
being criminals, special procedures for the hearing of juvenile of-
fenses have been established. 10
In accordance with this purpose, since its inception, it has
been the goal of the juvenile justice system that all proceedings be
conducted outside of the public's eye and that youths brought
before juvenile courts be shielded from publicity."' This insis-
tence on confidentiality is centered around a concern for the wel-
fare of the child, "to hide his youthful errors and bury them in the
graveyard of the forgotten past."112 The prohibition of publication
of ajuvenile's name is designed to protect her from the stigma of
her misconduct and is rooted in the principle that a court con-
cerned with juvenile affairs serves as a rehabilitative and protective
agency of the state. 13s It has always been held that the publication
or release of the names of juvenile offenders would seriously im-
pair the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system and hand-
icap the youths' prospects for adjustment in society and acceptance
by the public.114 Thus, the widespread dissemination of a juvenile
offender's name would detract from the "beneficent and rehabili-
tative purposes" of a state's juvenile court system. 115 However, as
109 141 CONG. REc. S13,656-05 (1995).
110 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 53; Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 156 N.E.2d
649, 651 (Mass. 1959).
111 See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107 (1979).
112 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1967).
113 Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. at 107.
114 Id. at 107-08.
115 Id.
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indicated by statutes in various states, this desire for confidentiality
has rapidly crumbled and entered into the school setting.
States which permit the suspension and/or expulsion of a stu-
dent based on a charge and/or conviction generally provide for
the release of juvenile records to the school district."16 As demon-
strated by the statutes cited, the court is allowed, and under some
statutes, mandated to inform members of the school district of a
student's charge and/or conviction. This is a substantial departure
from the intent of the juvenile justice system and provides no assur-
ance that a student is not treated according to the charge. Once a
116 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-27-309(d) ("Prosecuting attorneys or the juve-
nile court may provide information, concerning the disposition ofjuveniles who have
been adjudicated delinquent to the school superintendent of a school district. Fur-
ther, when ajuvenile is adjudicated delinquent for an offense for which he could have
been charged as an adult or for unlawful possession of a handgun, the prosecuting
attorney shall notify the school superintendent of the school district in which the
juvenile is currently enrolled."); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-119(5) ("Whenever a
petition filed in juvenile court alleges that a child between the ages of 14 and 18 years
has committed an offense that would constitute a crime of violence if committed by
an adult or whenever charges filed in district court allege that a child has committed
such an offense, then the arrest and criminal records information shall be made avail-
able to the public. Basic identification information, along with details of the alleged
delinquent act or offense, shall be provided immediately to the school district in
which the child is enrolled."); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-761 ("The court may permit an
inspection of any papers or records and the court shall make the identity of a person
who is adjudged a youthful offender as a result of a felony known to the superinten-
dent of schools. Such superintendent shall use the information for school placement
or disciplinary purposes only."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.045(5) ("All information ob-
tained in the discharge of official duty by any judge. ... is confidential and may be
disclosed only to the . .. school superintendents and their designees. Within each
county, the sheriff ... school superintendent, and the department shall enter into an
agreement to share information about juvenile offenders among all parties. In addi-
tion, subsection provides that .... when a child of any age is taken into custody by a
law enforcement officer for an offense that would have been a felony if committed by
an adult, or a crime of violence, the law enforcement agency must notify the superin-
tendent of schools that the child is alleged to have committed the delinquent act.
Upon notification, the principal is authorized to begin disciplinary actions. In addi-
tion, the information must be released within 48 hours after receipt to appropriate
school personnel of the school of the child. The principal must immediately notify
the child's immediate classroom teachers."); LA. RFv. STAT. ANN. ch. 3, art. 412(H) (1)
("Within 24 hours after receiving a predisposition report, the sentencing court shall
order the release of any portion of a predisposition report containing and limited to
conviction, adjudication, or disposition of a child in grades seven through twelve, who
is arrested, charged, or adjudicated a delinquent for committing a felony-grade delin-
quent act or a misdemeanor-grade delinquent act involving the distribution or posses-
sion with intent to distribute a controlled substance or any violent offense against the
person, to the principal of the school in which the child is registered and enrolled or
registered and enrolled but suspended. Such notification shall be a continuing re-
sponsibility of the court through adjudication and disposition. The principal shall
have a continuing responsibility to advise each teacher who has that student assigned
to his class of the notification, within two school days, after the principal receives it.").
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teacher or principal is informed of the child's history, that student
will not receive the same educational benefits as other children
whether they are expelled or not.
After receiving the label of delinquent, a student will be ex-
pected to exhibit certain behavior and, accordingly, these expecta-
tions will be communicated repeatedly and effectively to the
individual." 7 In addition, these expectations will influence teach-
ers' and other school personnel's responses to the student, as well
as the student's self-concept and response to the community." 8
Consequently, this will serve the opposite role of rehabilitation.
"[Tihe stigmatization of a young person as 'bad,' and the negative
responses of the larger community to the juvenile once she or he is
categorized as 'delinquent' all contribute to the likelihood that a
juvenile will embark upon more and perhaps escalated delinquent
activities. The social definition of the young person, complete with
officially pronounced disapproval and condemnation, may act as a
triggering agent or a catalyst that propels the juvenile into more
delinquency."" 9
In addition, students are often placed into "tracks" 20 when it
is known that they have a court record. These tracks have two ef-
fects. First, students are typically assigned to low-functioning class-
rooms which are below the students' actual levels of functioning
because teachers, principals, other school personnel, and students
themselves come to expect less.12 ' Second, in response to this
placement, the student will engage in school crime both to live up
to school personnel's expectations as well as their own expecta-
tions" and also to obtain some level of success and well-being. 2 1
Unfortunately, courts are aware of this detriment but are un-
willing to step in and correct the situation. 1'2 4 Therefore, the judi-
ciary has left to the discretion of the legislature the decision
regarding the precise type of treatment a juvenile should receive as
compared to an adult. This is demonstrated in court rulings that
while "publicity might have an adverse effect on the prospects of
117 BORTNER, supra note 94, at 249.
118 BORTNE:R, supra note 94, at 249.
119 BORTNER, supra note 94, at 250.
120 Richard Lawrence, Controlling School Crime: An Examination of Interorganizational
Relations of School and Juvenile Justice Professionals, 46 Juv. & FAM. CT.J. 3, 7 (1995).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 8 (citing D.H. Kelly & W.T. Pink, School Crime and Individual Responsibility:
The Perpetuation of a Myth, 14 URa. REv. 47, 55 (1982)).
123 Id,
124 See, e.g., News Group Boston, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 568 N.E.2d 600 (Mass.
1991).
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rehabilitation of a particularjuvenile and, [while] public disclosure
of certain information about a juvenile could have adverse conse-
quences,... [it is] a question for legislative judgment"12 as to what
type of differential treatment a juvenile should receive.
Therefore, while courts admit that public access to ajuvenile's
name has a negative impact on the entire rehabilitative process,
they are unwilling to correct it. This is worsened by the fact that
expulsion statutes are applicable to students who are only alleged to
have committed a crime. In such cases, there has been no convic-
tion according to law, yet there has been a conviction according to
society.
Recent legislative enactments demonstrate that juvenile
records are becoming more and more accessible to the public
either through open court rooms or failure to seal or expunge
records. While some statutes still restrict many segments of the
public from access to such records, the only individuals who ap-
pear to have little or no access are employers. This has remained
such so that courts can protect a juvenile's ability to obtain future
employment. However, this same reasoning is an argument that
may be made for education. It is allowed by state statute that if a
child is convicted of committing a felony, she may be excluded
from school permanently or for a lengthy period of time. If courts
do not step in and limit access to a juvenile's criminal record to
school departments and personnel, those juveniles convicted will
be denied an equal opportunity to an education and, therefore,
will not have an equal opportunity for employment because they
will lack the necessary skills. Not only will the release of confiden-
tial records allow for the failure of states to provide juveniles with
an education, it will also influence ajuvenile's future involvement
in crime because students will not be able to obtain employment to
provide for themselves and their families.
D. Presumption of Innocence
Many expulsion statutes overlook the premise behind the jus-
tice system that a person is innocent until proven guilty. This is
evident in the fact that school districts are permitted to suspend
and/or expel a student who has simply been charged with a felony
or delinquent act. There is no required scrutiny of the facts which
underlie the charge nor is there a reasonable doubt standard
under which conviction could be had. Instead, a report is simply
125 Id. at 603.
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received stating that the student has been charged for an offense
and the school then decides whether such alleged behavior would
be harmful to other students and/or school personnel. What
about a determination that the student in fact committed the al-
leged act? No time is given to analyze the facts. The premise
seems to have now become guilty until you prove yourself
innocent.
Further, under expulsion statutes which are based upon con-
viction and/or adjudication, students that have pled guilty to
charges brought against them are expelled. They are also expelled
for judgments of a continuance without a finding. Therefore, it
must always be explained to a student that if they plead guilty to a
charge, regardless of the reason, they will be expelled from school.
This is also an issue which should be addressed by the defense to a
judge when a juvenile in a state providing for such an expulsion is
faced with a felony or juvenile charge. Without this discussion,
many more students are going to be expelled from school with no
further education.
V. PossmLE SOLUTIONS
When considering possible solutions, I believe that there are
two areas which must be addressed: (1) pre-delinquent interven-
tion'2 6 and (2) post-adjudication intervention. 127 Within these two
areas, I will discuss programs which have previously been and/or
are currently being implemented. In addition, I will present issues
which must be addressed in order to work towards the prevention
of violence which expulsion statutes do not address.
However, prior to considering the following solutions, the best
solutions are to either abolish or amend all current expulsion stat-
utes. I am of the strong belief that the only true way to prevent this
injustice and deprivation of an education is to abolish all existing
expulsion statutes. If this is not an option, then these statutes must
be amended so as to mandate that an alternative education be pro-
vided to all students who are expelled regardless of the reason. If
neither option is to occur, then we must look to the following
solutions.
A. Pre-Delinquent Intervention
It is my contention that before Congress and the various state
126 RI cHARD J. LunmAN, PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 13
(1984).
127 Id. at 14.
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legislatures can begin to punish specific conduct, they must first
determine the cause and, in response, possible solutions to prevent
such violent behavior.
In approaching violence in the schools, Congress and the leg-
islatures must first determine the cause and then attempt to pre-
vent such behavior from occurring within society. To approach
this, there are several things that must be done.
First, legislative bodies must actually talk and listen to stu-
dents. Students, much more than the government, have some idea
as to what the cause is, and how to prevent violence in the schools.
This is so simply because it is students who are either carrying
weapons or who need protection from those who are. It is difficult,
if not impossible, for Congress and state legislatures to address the
issue of school violence without knowing how adolescents struggle
with the issue. When asked about violence and its effect on the
future, one student responded that:
[t]he world today is very violent and it is hard trying to survive. I
picture the world as a big tree, and everyone starts at the bottom
and when you are at the top you have survived. On your way to
the top are many branches, twigs and leaves. I try to move to the
top very fast, but carefully.
I made a lot of mistakes. On the way I have shot at people. I
have gotten into gangs. I have stabbed people, and have fought
people. As I moved deeper down the branches, (they) get thin-
ner and thinner and at the end that is where I fall and die.
What I tried to do is leave the branch. Put myself in reverse and
move on.
I moved a little. I go to school and I don't sell drugs yet, hope-
fully, I won't. Hopefully, I'll just move the right way, move to-
wards a positive branch.' 28
Another student stated that "[a] s for the future, I see a bunch of bod-
ies lying on the street.""2 9
In addition, when asked about possible solutions, the answers one
would most likely hear are "I would have counseling"3" or "I would
make all gangs come together during school hours and make a little
peace treaty during school hours"13'- or "it's not a matter of more se-
curity or any types of things like that as it is kicking the knowledge to
128 DEBORAH PROTHROw-STITH & MICHAEL WEISMANN, DEADLY CONSEQUENCES:
How VIOLENCE IS DESTROYING OUR TEENAGE POPULATION AND A PLAN To BEGIN SOLV-
ING THE PROBLEM 87 (1991).
129 Id. at 94.
IS0 Lynette Richardson & Debra Williams, Teens Sound Off On School Security, CATA-
LYST, Nov. 1994, at 11.
'3' Id.
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the people that this is your school, making safety for yourself ....
They need to come out with some kind of counseling thing where
students try to work out their problems by themselves."1
3 2
While talking to students may seem somewhat trivial, simplistic,
and idealistic, it is what the students believe is needed and, therefore,
are solutions that must be addressed when implementing solutions to
the problem of violence in neighborhoods and schools.
This style of conversation with students is the first necessary step
which must be taken when considering possible methods of preven-
tion rather than, or at least before, punishment In order to combat a
problem, there must be a cause. Simply punishing the behavior after
it occurs is not going to correct or prevent it from occurring in an-
other neighborhood or school.
In addition to talking with students, Congress and the states
should look to other school districts around the nation to consider
programs which, through student involvement, have been imple-
mented to combat and prevent the issue of violence.
For example, in Chicago, Illinois, public schools have imple-
mented a program known as STAR (Straight Talk About Risks). 3
This program attempts to teach children about the dangers of guns,
how to recognize threatening situations, and how to make wise
choices to ensure their safety.' 34
In Baltimore, Maryland, after the superintendent of schools real-
ized that children were afraid of going to and from school, the public
schools created a "safety corridor." 3 ' This involves a group of
churches, businesses, and other institutions that volunteer to open
their doors to students for two hours before and after school.' 36 The
volunteers are trained in conflict resolution and crime prevention and
have also been taught what to do if a child has been involved in a
crime, is injured or ill, or is just plain scared.' 37
In Cleveland, Ohio, public schools have developed a program for
elementary school students which teaches what is and is not appropri-
ate behavior. The program teaches kids what hands should and
should not be used for, as well as covering such issues as sexual mis-
conduct, fighting, and cheating on tests." 8
132 1&.
'33 Teaching Kids How to Handle Anger, Avoid Violence, CATALYST, Nov. 1994, at 12.
'34 Id.
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In conjunction with the aforementioned, there must be a re-in-
vestment of economic resources into poor, underserved communities.
Resources are necessary to rebuild and revitalize neighborhoods and
business districts of these communities. We must devise programs in
which youth from surrounding communities go into neighborhoods
and clean up streets and alleyways, paint buildings, and help remodel
the interiors and exteriors of vacant buildings. Buildings that are re-
modeled may then be rented or sold, or used for subsidized housing.
By this revitalization, businesses will be more apt to move back into
these communities, thus creating jobs for the unemployed.
Through the implementation of such programs, youth will begin
to feel a sense of pride in their communities and in themselves due to
their involvement in the revitalization process. In addition, with the
revitalization of neighborhoods, adults will also begin to take pride in
their communities. With a new sense of pride, adults will have a rea-
son to take back their neighborhoods and they will have a better sense
of self due to better living conditions. This in turn will have a positive
effect on their children.
There must also be a financial investment in the school system.
All schools need to be upgraded to a standard that far surpasses what
is currently available in many areas throughout the country. Through
the reinvestment of money, more teachers can be hired which will
help lower classroom size, making them more personal and struc-
tured. This is essential because, "[rlesearch shows that schools with
strong principals; schools that are not too large; schools where disci-
pline is fair, but firm; schools where teachers are imbued with high
expectations for every child; schools where parents are drawn into the
educational orbit, are schools where learning takes place.""3 9 With an
investment of funding, these factors will be attainable.
Further, the curriculum in schools must be improved so as to in-
clude cultural education, drug and alcohol awareness programs, and
violence prevention programs.
First, by teaching students about all cultures we are educating
them about different histories, backgrounds and races. This is essen-
tial because if children are taught about our differences, then they will
also be made aware of our commonalities. In addition, if children
learn about their ancestors, they will have more pride in who they are.
Second, children need to be educated about violence and drugs
and alcohol in the first grade because they are subjected to these
things at a very young age due to television, movies and society. How-
139 PROTHOW-STITH & WEISMANN, supra note 128, at 168.
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ever, this education needs to continue throughout a child's schooling
and, as students progress into higher grades, this education should
become much more intense, specific and straight forward. The effects
and consequences of violence and drugs and alcohol should be ex-
pressed in a very honest and realistic manner. Students need to be
made aware that death is final and effects many people, both in rela-
tion to the victim and the perpetrator.
Moreover, there need to be other outlets presented to youth that
take the place of "hanging out" on street comers with their friends.
Possible outlets can include such things as the Boys and Girls Clubs,
neighborhood sports leagues, neighborhood dances, or community
centers where kids can go to be with their friends while taking part in
some form of activity. Through these types of centers, youth are taken
off the street and given other choices that are fun and social.
Making available after-school, weekend, and evening youth activ-
ities that provide academic, vocational, athletic, artistic, and
other types of activities for young people will provide positive
opportunities to prevent crimes [because we] are providing life-
enhancing alternatives to criminal activity. Midnight sports
league programs, for example, provide young people with struc-
tured athletic, educational, and job training activities that keep
at-risk youth off the street at night and provide key educational
and employment support.14°
Another solution that must be considered is counseling services
in schools. Schools need to provide both individual and group coun-
seling for those youth who have either become involved with violence
or who are within a high-risk population. Through counseling, stu-
dents will find other options for dealing with feelings and fears that
do not involve violence.
Individual counseling is important because it provides students
with a neutral person with whom to talk. Many of these youth do not
have, or feel they do not have, an adult figure in their lives to whom
they can go to talk about issues which are creating pressures and fears.
Further, there needs to be some form of groupwork with these
youth. Groupwork is important because it shows kids that they are not
alone-that there are others with the same issues they have. It is
often easier for a youth to listen to someone their own age who is
going through or has gone through similar experiences and who is
growing up under the same pressures.
In looking at other solutions for the prevention of violence, we
need to realize that youth are affected by many varying environmental
140 Committee Hearing, supra note 50.
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and psychological factors that were not as prevalent two decades ago
when the juvenile justice system was in its prime. One such factor is a
self-fulfilling prophecy 4 ' Many of our youth have been stereotyped
as being part of a population that is lazy, uneducated, and involved
with drugs and, therefore, heavily involved in crime and violence. In
response to this, society treats youth according to this stereotype and,
after having been treated accordingly for such a significant period of
time and by such a significant number of people, "[e]ventually, the
prophecy creates the facts which prove it correct." 4 2 Our youth have
seen generations before them follow in those footsteps and believe
that it is the only way of life. With this "criminal" lifestyle comes not
only an image of a person driving a nice car, but also the necessary
concern of being safe. Many youth who are involved in violence grow
up in a community in which they live in fear. This typically means
growing up very fast and much to soon. To the younger population, a
nice car and money means respect from one's peers, while fear means
safety.
Moreover, a feeling of isolation, poor relationships with friends
and family, weak decision making skills, and low self-esteem, are inter-
nal beliefs or feelings that motivate a youth towards violence. 143
Through the use of weapons and criminal involvement, a youth is
achieving a sense of respect which helps to relieve feelings of loneli-
ness and self-doubt. In conjunction with this, we must also look at the
environment in which most kids involved in violence are living, the
type of activities they engage in, and opportunities they have available
to them.' While there are kids that have achieved while growing up
in the same situation, we must address the ones that have not. We
must determine what it is that they need to achieve.
There have been several programs at various times throughout
the country which have addressed all of the issues which I have dis-
cussed in the hopes of solving this very problem. These programs,
some of which are either still in existence or which have been repli-
cated, were developed specifically to prevent violence in communities.
For example, the Chicago Area Project (CAP), which began in 1932,
attempts to prevent juvenile delinquency through neighborhood in-
volvement and improvement. 45 This program, which functions
mostly through adult volunteers, encourages adults within the neigh-
141 BORTNER, supra note 94, at 249.
142 BORTNER, supra note 94, at 249 (citing Kai T. Erikson, Notes on the Sociology of
Deviance 302 in THOMASJ. Sc-Eur, MENTAL IL.NEss AND SocIAL PROCESssES (1967)).
143 BORTNER, supra note 94, at ]218-24.
144 BORTNEzR, supra note 94, at 218-24.
145 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 58.
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borhood to join community committees, elect committee leaders, and
initiate fund-raising activities. 146 The funds which are raised are spent
mostly to employ indigent gang workers who are assigned to neigh-
borhood youth gangs, refurbish rented storefront community centers,
and buy sports equipment used in the recreational programs run by
adult volunteers.
1 47
Through community committees, CAP focuses on three primary
activities. First, it sponsors recreational programs for neighborhood
children through the use of neighborhood park facilities. In addition,
several of the community committees built summer camps outside of
the city and sponsor extensive summer camp programs for neighbor-
hood juveniles.' 48 Second, community committees sponsor needed
community improvement campaigns which focus primarily on health
care, sanitation, educational, and law enforcement services.149 Lastly,
community committees engage in specific activities intended to pre-
vent and control juvenile delinquency. 15
The prevention of juvenile delinquency is done in several ways.
First, CAP employs indigent gang workers who are assigned to neigh-
borhood youth gangs. 5 ' Second, gang workers, staff members, and
adult volunteers advocate on behalf of neighborhood juveniles with
the juvenile justice system. 152 These workers also advocate on behalf
of neighborhood juveniles prior to arrest, following arrest, and during
incarceration. 153 However, if these attempts fail, staff members and
volunteers frequently visit the juvenile so they realize that the commu-
nity is still behind them and is ready to provide acceptance and assist-
ance upon their return."
Similarly, Midcity Project (MP), which was located in Boston,
Massachusetts, from 1954 to 1957, also directed its efforts at three fac-
tors thought to play a causal role in urban delinquency: the commu-
nity, the family, and the neighborhood gang.'55 MP developed and
strengthened previously existing community groups and utilized ex-
isting professional agencies, such as settlement houses."5 In addition,
families which had a long history of repeated use of welfare services
146 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 62.
147 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 62.
148 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 62.
149 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 62-63.
150 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 63.
151 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 63.
152 LuNDMAN, supra note 126, at 63.
153 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 63.
154 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 63.
155 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 68.
156 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 68.
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were identified and subjected to a special and intensive program of
psychologically-oriented case-work.1 57
However, the major thrust of MP's work was similar to that of
CAP's work with indigent gang members. The only noticeable differ-
ence was that MP's workers were social workers with graduate de-
grees.158 These workers changed the gangs into formal clubs, served
as "intermediaries between gang members and adult institutions, such
as employers, schools, police, and other professional agencies, and en-
couraged law-abiding behavior through groupwork techniques, per-
suasion, and role modeling."' 59 The workers were in contact with the
gangs on an average of three times per week, and each of these con-
tacts lasted between five and six hours. 'I The remainder of the work-
ers' time was spent performing other services such as conferences with
teachers and police officers. 16' These services lasted for approxi-
mately ten to thirty-four months. 6
The last project worth mentioning, the New York Mobilization for
Youth (MFY), functioned under the premise that youth must be given
an opportunity to act in nondelinquent ways so as to prevent them
from participating in delinquent acts. 163 MFY included thirty separate
programs which focused on the areas of work, education, community
organizations, and group service. 64
One of MFYs programs, Urban Youth Services Corps, hired sev-
eral hundred unemployed neighborhood youths and focused on fos-
tering the types of attitudes and behaviors (e.g., following orders,
reporting to work on time) necessary to succeed in the working world,
and on strengthening the participants' job skills."6 Following this
training, a Youth Jobs Center attempted to find permanent jobs for
those who successfully completed the training program.' 66
In addition to Youth Services Corps, MFY also created educa-
tional programs, such as the Homework Helper program, in which
low-income high school students were hired to tutor children in ele-
157 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 68 (citing Walter B. Miller, The Impact of a 'Total
Community'Delinquency Control Project, SOCIAL PROBLEMS, Fall 1962, at 169).
158 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 69.
159 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 69.
160 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 70.
161 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 70.
162 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 70.
163 ALBERT R. ROBERTS, JUVENILE JUSTICE: PouIEs, PROGRAMS, AND SERVICES, 47-48
(1989).
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mentary school.16 7
Lastly, a group service aspect of the project included services for
youths who had joined a gang, as well as delinquency prevention pro-
grams aimed at younger children.' 68 For youths aged eight through
twelve, MFY developed the Adventure Corps which was a character-
building organization designed to reach delinquency-prone youths by
providing exciting recreational and educational activities for young
people as an alternative to gang membership. 1
69
While these are only a few prevention programs that have been
and can be implemented, through their use, it is my contention that
many youth will have a better sense of self and feeling of safety. They
will be given guaranteed choices to help alleviate some of the issues
and pressures that are prevalent in their daily lives. Through these
programs, students have another route offered other than the path of
violence.
While society is concerned with the cost of funding these types of
programs, we must realize that violence in itself is a very costly prob-
lem. The cost of criminal violence on a national scale has been esti-
mated to cost more than $3.5 billion, with $1.5 billion resulting from
firearms. 170 The average cost to treat a child wounded by a gun is
more than $14,000 alone. 17 1 With costs being this high, how can we
not afford to invest in the prevention of violence? With this invest-
ment, we are not only helping those individuals who are at-risk of be-
coming juvenile offenders, but we are improving society as a whole
while also helping to prevent a problem.
In addition to these prevention programs, other steps need to be
taken which many may view as extreme. One such step is either a
complete ban on weapons or some other action which will make it
more difficult for a person to purchase a weapon. While individuals
are given such a fundamental right under the United States Constitu-
tion,"7 some control needs to be in place so that access to these weap-
ons is not so simple. It should be of great concern to society that a
youth on the street can obtain a weapon faster than she can obtain a
Big Mac.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 49.
169 Id/.
170 Committee Hearing, supra note 50.
171 Committee Hearing, supra note 50.
172 U.S. Const. amend. II.
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B. Post-Adjudication Intervention
In regards to individuals who have been convicted for felonies
or adjudicated delinquent, services must be provided to them so
that they are not simply placed back in a situation in which they
were unable to function previously without the use of violence. In-
tensive counseling needs to be provided while a youth is either in
lock-up or in a detention center so that she is taught ways to handle
the stress of growing up in a violent world. This is important espe-
cially when kids are carrying weapons because "they think [that] by
carrying guns .... they will be protected from dying."' 73
An example of a program that has implemented these services
is the Provo Experiment (Provo), an all-boys program which was
located in Utah County, Utah between 1959 and 1965. Provo was
premised on the belief that treatment had to be community based,
because it was in the community that juveniles made their delin-
quent decisions. 74 This nonresident facility utilized an intensive
group program with employment and a delinquent peer group as
the primary instruments of treatment.175 In Provo, the boys pri-
marily lived at home and when they were not in school, they were
either working in a paid city program or at the site partaking in
group activity. However, following their departure from either
school or work, the boys attended a group meeting. 76 Following
the completion of the meetings, the boys returned to their own
homes. During the summer, except on rare occasions, every boy
attended an all-day program which involved work and group dis-
cussion. 177 This treatment program lasted approximately five to six
months for each boy. 178
In accordance with the services previously mentioned, it is es-
sential that individuals who have been expelled under weapon and
conviction statutes be provided with educational services. How-
ever, these services must be more structured and monitored than
regular school services. This alternative education should include
individualized instruction, reward systems, goal-oriented work,
strong and competent teachers, small classrooms, and continuous
activity. While these sound like essential elements of all educa-
tional services, it is primarily needed in the case of at-risk juveniles.
173 NoTHow-SriH & WEISSMAN, supra note 128, at 84.
174 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 157.
175 LuNDMAN, supra note 126, at 158.
176 LuNDMAN, supra note 126, at 158.
177 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 158.
178 LUNDMAN, supra note 126, at 158.
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These youth need structure and commitment in their lives so that
they can overcome the label and life they have come to know.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the past year, nearly 1000 students were expelled from
school under suspension and expulsion statutes.17 9 Twenty per-
cent of those expelled were thirteen-years old or younger, while
some were as young as eight-years old.'80 The offenses leading to
expulsion ranged from snapping a girl's bra strap to murder. If we
have any hope of saving the younger generation and preventing
further increase in the lethality of juvenile crime, we must realize
that expulsion statutes are not working. We must begin to progress
back to the thought process that initiated the separation of the ju-
venile justice system from the adult system. The focus must once
again be on rehabilitation and prevention as opposed to punish-
ment and retribution.
Unfortunately, the impetus behind expulsion statutes fails to
address these issues and are, therefore, not confronting the most
relevant factors which permeate violence in and around schools.
Because of this, the goal behind expulsion statutes is unassailable
because the statutes do not provide solutions to problems which
actually plague the public schools and surrounding communities.
Often, the statutes actually create more harm than good.
179 Student Expulsions on the Rise, LAWYERS WKLY., May 8, 1995, at 8.
180 Id.
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